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I asked people to describe their most thunderous epiphany. That is, should technologically-facilitated remorse be honoured such that it is permitted the same penal significance as standard instances of remorse? To focus our discussion, it is useful to consider briefly the grounds for the general claim that we should mitigate the sentence of a remorseful offender in the standard case.

We lack the space here to distinguish and analyse all the possible arguments for remorse-based mitigation 53 ; rather, our intention here is to provide a brief overview of ways in which one might justify this practice.

This will allow us to identify the justification that is most likely to challenge the hypothetical role for neurointerventions in facilitating remorse. Here, though, we shall be interested in a retributive justification of remorse-based mitigation.

Of course, there are a number of ways in which one might seek to offer a retributive justification of remorse-based mitigation. On a classical retributive view, it might be claimed that, if remorse is aversive enough to constitute suffering, then it may constitute or substitute for some of the deserved punishment. Alternatively, theorists who claim a legitimate role for mercy in retributive penal theory may argue that remorse justifies leniency grounded on a charitable concern for the wellbeing of the offender.

Although we cannot adequately defend the claim here, we believe that this framework offers the most plausible grounds for remorse-based mitigation. Nonetheless, we shall examine the issue through the lens of the moral value view for two reasons. Whilst this intuition is in tension with the consequentialist approach, the moral value view potentially provides a theoretical basis for it.

As such, we shall frame our discussion through the lens of the latter view, as doing so will better enable us to examine and test our intuitions about whether natural remorse is preferable to enhanced remorse, independently of its consequences. Second, we believe that the moral value view offers the strongest grounds for an objection to honouring remorse that has been facilitated through the use of neurointerventions.

We therefore situate our discussion within such a framework, so that we can confront what we take to be the most serious objection to the honouring of such remorse in the criminal justice system.

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If the view that remorse is morally valuable is to be plausible, it seems that one must first establish that any emotional experience can be morally valuable. Although some writers have denied this sort of claim, 60 it seems that remorse is a good candidate for a morally-valuable emotion. In order to focus our discussion, we shall make the following two assumptions throughout.

First, in order to circumvent concerns about the permissibility of non-consensual medical interventions, we shall assume that the offender has provided valid consent to undergoing the interventions we consider. Furthermore, it might be argued that some of the interventions considered above might be less efficacious in facilitating an experience of remorse in an offender who is subjected to them involuntarily.

The question of whether this would be the case is itself an interesting theoretical question.

However, answering it would require making empirical speculations about the interventions that we cannot adequately explore here. We note that, if this were the case, it would add a further complicating factor to the moral analysis that we undertake here.

Whilst these assumptions may to some extent limit the scope of the potential practical applications of our arguments, as we mentioned in the introduction, we are interested here only in establishing the theoretical plausibility of facilitating morally-valuable remorse through the use of neurointerventions in at least some cases. This, though, is not to deny the importance of the questions raised by the possibility of inducing remorse in people who have only an instrumental desire to feel it, perhaps because they want to ensure that they receive more lenient sentences, for example.

The question of whether the criminal justice system should honour such remorse is one of the central questions that would have to be addressed if the use of the technologies described above became practicable.

After all, the reasons that an advocate of this view might cite in rejecting the practice of an individual enhancing her capacity for remorse on the basis of a non-instrumental desire to feel remorse would also apply to the practice of her doing so on the basis of an instrumental desire to feel remorse. With these assumptions in mind, it seems that the moral value justification of remorse-based mitigation can ground a strong objection to honouring remorse that has been facilitated by a neurointervention, insofar as it may be plausible to claim that neurointerventions cannot give rise to genuine, morally-valuable remorse.

To begin explicating this sort of objection, consider first the claim that the genuineness of some moral properties depends on the process by which they were acquired.

This seems particularly true of the virtues; it seems plausible to suggest that an agent genuinely exhibits a virtue only if she has acquired virtuous dispositions in an appropriate way, say through education and habituation.

She then takes a pill that directly induces a negative emotional affect, and a motivation to refrain from doing X again.

It seems plausible to claim that the offender in this case could not appropriately be described as experiencing genuinely morally-valuable remorse even though, ex hypothesi, she meets the criteria for all the elements of remorse that we delineated in the first section of the paper. This example might raise an important objection to the potential role of neurointerventions in facilitating remorse, since one might go further and claim that there is no morally significant difference between the remorse pill and the use of the neurointerventions discussed above.

However, we believe that this latter move is too quick. To see why, consider the following claims made by Martha Nussbaum: The agent who discerns intellectually that a friend is in need or that a loved one has died, but who fails to respond to these facts with appropriate sympathy or grief clearly lacks a part of Aristotelian virtue. It seems right in addition to say that a part of discernment or perception is lacking.

Their responses are part of what … truly recognising or acknowledging consists in. Hills claims that it is possible to have moral knowledge without having moral understanding, insofar as it is possible to know that something is morally right or wrong without appreciating the explanation for why this is the case.

The absence of such an emotional response bespeaks an absence of moral understanding, and this, it might be argued, is not only a central feature of remorse, but also grounds its moral value. If this is right, then the moral value of remorse might be understood to derive in large part from the relationship between the aversive affect and the beliefs that generate it in a genuine experience of remorse.

See a Problem?

On this view, it is not merely the affective element of remorse to which we attribute value, it is remorse conceived as a response that also involves moral understanding, which the affective element helps to elucidate.

The remorse pill example shows the problem with attempting to capture the essence of remorse by simply identifying and distinguishing its cognitive, affective and motivational elements. In order to adequately capture the value of the moral understanding that remorse involves, we must also attend to the interrelations between these different elements.

Accordingly, it seems that there might be plausible grounds for claiming that we should not honour the remorse that is experienced by an offender who took the remorse pill on the moral value view of remorse-based mitigation. If these conclusions regarding the incompatibility of the remorse pill and genuine remorse should carry over to the use of the neurointerventions to facilitate remorse, then it must be the case that such neurointerventions would similarly undermine the morally-valuable understanding that remorse involves, by similarly divorcing the affective and motivational elements of remorse from the cognitive element.

Yet it is not clear that this would be the case. This is most obvious when the neurointervention in question simply enables the agent to hold the non-evaluative beliefs that are relevant to remorse.

Consider the use of promnesic interventions that might allow an amnesic offender to retrieve memories of her wrongdoing. Even if an offender came to hold the relevant non-evaluative beliefs about her offence on the basis of such an intervention, it is unclear why those beliefs would not be able to play the same role in generating the affective elements of remorse that they would have played had they been formed naturally in the absence of this sort of intervention.

An offender who undergoes a promnesic intervention would only feel remorse if she also comes to hold the relevant evaluative beliefs and forms the appropriate affective response to these newly acquired beliefs.

As such, we might say that a promnesic intervention enables an offender to hold the non-evaluative beliefs without having a direct influence on whether those beliefs will generate the relevant evaluative beliefs and appropriate affective response.

In contrast, we can understand the remorse pill in the above example to go beyond the mere facilitation of remorse, since it directly induces the affective element of remorse in a manner that disconnects the affective and cognitive elements of remorse.

The problem with inducing remorse in this way is that, in disconnecting these elements of remorse, we undermine its moral value. Emotional empathy enhancements might be understood to be more problematic in this regard. Indeed, if one were to understand the enhancement of emotional empathy as simply amounting to imposing an experience of the negative aversive affect that remorse connotes, then enhancements of emotional empathy would be indistinguishable from the remorse pill.

However, our above discussion of moral understanding and the moral value of remorse suggest a more complex picture of the role of emotional empathy in remorse. For an individual with a sufficient degree of emotional empathy to experience this affect, she must be presented with an emotional stimulus; in the case of remorse, this stimulus is the belief that she has significantly wronged another.

The affect generated by the remorse pill, in contrast, requires no such belief. Furthermore, our above discussion suggests that emotional empathy can also be understood to serve as a mode of moral perception that allows individuals to hold evaluative beliefs that incorporate moral concepts. As we shall now argue, on this interpretation of the role of emotional empathy in remorse, emotional empathy enhancements need not disrupt the crucial connection between the cognitive and affective elements of remorse.

As we pointed out in Sect. Presumably, part of the reason that we do not believe that this training undermines the genuineness of the remorse that it might precipitate is that such training does not simply induce the aversive affect that is associated with remorse in a manner that is unrelated to the cognitive element; rather, the hope is that such training may lead offenders to develop emotional responses to their beliefs about their causing others harm in the way that constitutes a virtuous form of moral understanding of the sort we sketched above.

It is not clear why neurointerventions that enhance emotional empathy cannot be understood in a similar fashion. Empathy enhancements need not simply induce an aversive affect in the recipient like the remorse pill; emotional empathy should not simply be equated with the affective experience to which it might give rise. Rather, on the view that we have developed in this section, such enhancements might be understood as providing offenders with the tools to develop an appropriate affective response.

On this view, enhancing emotional empathy can be understood to involve making this mode of moral perception available to the offender, but it need not determine a particular, all things considered response to what he perceives.

As such, even if the enhanced offender only feels an aversive affect following the neurointervention, this does not entail that deliberative processes have not mediated the aversive affect in any way.

Rather, the empathetic offender will only experience the aversive affect insofar as she perceives it to be an appropriate response to her beliefs. The fact that the mode of moral perception underlying this belief is facilitated by a neurointervention does not threaten the crucial connection between the cognitive and affective elements of remorse. So far, we have suggested that critics might object to honouring remorse that has been facilitated by neurointerventions on the basis that such interventions could not bring about genuine, morally-valuable remorse.

Whilst we have argued that such an objection does not apply to the sorts of interventions that we considered in Sect. They might suggest that the problem with such interventions is that the remorse they facilitate would not be morally valuable because it is not authentic to the agent.

We shall conclude by considering the strength of this sort of objection. Authenticity-based objections are often raised in the neuro-ethics literature. However, the two effects may not be coextensive, and it will be helpful to begin our discussion by explaining why not.

Such radical neurointerventions could be understood to serve as a perverse form of capital punishment, insofar as they terminate the existence of the agent in a narrative sense who committed the offence. However, as we shall suggest below, insofar as memories constitute a psychological connection that can ground personal identity, promnesic interventions might be understood as strengthening identity on a psychological account, rather than undermining it. The application of an objection based on concerns related to authenticity and personal identity is particularly interesting in this context because, even in standard cases of remorse, the remorseful offender is understood to have undergone a significant change that can be understood as an abandonment of important aspects of her previous self; experiencing remorse inherently involves a rejection of past conduct, intentions and attitudes.

Yet we presumably believe that remorse can be authentic to the agent in the normal case; moreover, as we pointed out in Sect. In order to get clearer on this, it is prudent to say a little more about the concept of authenticity. Broadly speaking, there are two ways in which one can understand authenticity.

Furthermore, it might even be argued that the essentialist understanding cannot ground a strong objection to this practice. To illustrate, consider again the example of the remorse pill. The pill would, it might be claimed, threaten authenticity by creating a disjunction between the person who committed the offence, and the person who feels the remorse. As we suggested above, the problem with this objection at first glance is that even in standard cases of remorse this sort of disjunction can be understood to obtain in some sense.

Accordingly, to increase the plausibility of the objection, it seems that its proponents need to claim that the remorse pill differs from the standard case in some way. Yet, even in the absence of a detailed account of intelligibility, in view of our discussion of moral understanding above, it seems that the interventions that we are considering in this paper would not render the remorse that they facilitate unintelligible on a plausible account of intelligibility.

Consider first promnesic interventions. In contrast to these interventions, it seems that the promnesic interventions that we have considered here would not only provide a basis for an intelligible personal development, they would also, if anything, restore key psychological continuities that ground personal identity, rather than undermine them, even if they were used non-consensually.

Furthermore, as noted above, an intervention that enhances empathy would not necessarily induce particular evaluative beliefs or feelings in the agent; rather, it would provide the agent with the perceptual apparatus required to respond in a compassionate way, without making it certain that she will. The agent must still evaluate the moral properties of her conduct and its consequences.

Enhanced empathy plays a role in making these properties more vivid and accessible, but it does not force a new set of values on the agent such that she is rendered disconnected from her earlier self. Indeed, we can imagine the agent, who, having had her empathy enhanced, experiences herself as having her attention directed to facts that were previously opaque to her, in a way that is consistent with intelligible personal development of the sort that critics of enhancement often celebrate, and the sort of moral understanding that we described above.

A further objection could be raised about the potentially transient nature of the effects of neurointerventions.Consider first promnesic interventions. The book itself was well written and during the introduction and setting of the situation it read like a doomsday story, making you feel bad about yourself and your sedentary future.

Presumably, part of the reason that we do not believe that this training undermines the genuineness of the remorse that it might precipitate is that such training does not simply induce the aversive affect that is associated with remorse in a manner that is unrelated to the cognitive element; rather, the hope is that such training may lead offenders to develop emotional responses to their beliefs about their causing others harm in the way that constitutes a virtuous form of moral understanding of the sort we sketched above.

For instance, Molly Crockett et al. At the outset, it is important to acknowledge the scope of our argument.

Furthermore, our above discussion suggests that emotional empathy can also be understood to serve as a mode of moral perception that allows individuals to hold evaluative beliefs that incorporate moral concepts.

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